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BAR BRIEFS
judgment, the right to reclaim the property is not defeated.
Canadian Typograph Co. v. Macguran, 119 Mich. 533, 78 N. W.
542 (1899).
So we have on one side the view that as the remedies of the
seller to retake possession or sue for the purchase price are inconsistent, one bars the other; on the other side, we have the view
that the contract provides that the seller shall have both remedies
until he receives his money. However, without deciding which is
the most logical, or which is the weight of authority, it would
seem that the principal case has reached the result which is the
most just to the seller under a conditional sale contract.
LYSLE C. BOOSTROM,
Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In J. K. Murray, Petr. and AppIt., vs. Fred Mutschelknaus, et al., Defts.
and Applts.,and State of North Dakota doing business as Bank of North Dakota, Intrs. and AppIts.
That an assessment becomes final within the contemplation of section 2,
chapter 225, S. I. N. D. 1939 when the state board of equalization causes an
abstract of its proceedings to be certified to the county auditor pursuant to
the provisions of section 2142, C. L. 1913.
That the period for instituting proceedings under chapter 225, S. L. 1939,
Is limited to one year from the date of certification by the state board of
equalization to the county auditor.
That it is presumed that the legislature intends a statute to operate prospectively only unless it clearly maWifests a contrary intention.
That where a statute is susceptible of two constructions by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided it is the duty of courts to adopt the latter
construction.
That Chapter 225, S. L. 1939 is construed to operate prospectively and to
apply only to tax assessments made subsequent to the effective date of the
act.
Appeal from the District Court of Hettinger County, Hon. R. G. McFarland, Special Judge. AFFWMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.
Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In The State of North Dakota ex rel Alvin C. Strutz, Attorney General.
Petr., vs. A. J. Huber, Auditor of Grant County, Reept.
That the duties of the county auditor in calculating the rate per cent of
tax levies and in spreading and extending the tax charges on the tax lists
against real property subject to taxation pursuant to the provisions of the
Initiated Measure, adopted June 29, 1932 (S. L. 1933, p. 493) section 2143 C. L.
1913 and chapter 241, S. r. 1929, are ministerial and their performance may
be compelled by mandamus.
That Chapter 225, S. L 1939 entitled "An act declaring all tax oharges
based on original final values of property assessed by local asseaors, in excess of amount that would have been charged had said original final value
been limited to the full and true value in money, null and void providing
remedy to the taxpayer; and repealing all laws or parts of laws in conflict
therewith," is considered and construed, and it is -held, for reasons stated in
the opinion, that said chapter 225 does not modify or repeal the provisions of
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the Initiated Measure adopted June 29, 1932 (Session Laws 1933, p. 493) section 2143, Comp. Laws 1913 and chapter 241, Session Laws 1929.
Appeal from the District Court of Grant County, Hon. H. L. Berry, Judge.
Petitioner for peremptory writ of mandamus. From a judgment denying the
writ, petitioner appears. REVERSED.
Opinion of the court by Nuessle,
Ch. J.
In The City of Dickinson, Pltf. and AppIt., vs. George Thress, Deft. and Respt.
That under the police power, the Legislature may regulate the keeping
of dogs.
That the Legislature may delegate to cities the right to exercise such
part of the police power concerning dogs as it may deem proper.
That a city has, and can exercise, only such powers as are conferred upon
it, either expressly or by fair implication by the law which created it, or by
other laws, constitutional or statutory, applicable to it.
That the sole object of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the lawmakers, and all rules of statutory
construction are subservient to, and intended to effectuate such object.
That the legislative intent must be ascertained from the statute and
must be sought first in the language thereof, the statute being construed as
a whole.
That where the language of a statute is vague, ambiguous, uncertain or
of doubtful meaning, the court must consider such -pertinent external facts
as may throw light upon the intent and purpose of the lawmakers, and thus
ascertain the true meaning of the language employed.
That where it is manifest upon the fact of a statute that an error has
been made in words, numbers, grammar or punctuation, the court, in construing and applying the statute, will correct the error in order that the intention of the legislature as gathered from the entire act may be given effect.
That Punctuation marks do not have the same controlling force as evidence of legislative -intention as do words; punctuation is subordinate to context.
That a city in North Dakota operating under the commission system of
government has power to enact an ordinance providing for the registration
of, and imposing a license tax upon, all dogs kept or harbored within the city,
and the power to require such registration and impose such license tax is not
restricted to dogs running at large.
From a judgment of the District Court of Stark County, Miller, J., plaintiff appeals.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
In Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, a corporation, Pltf. and Appit.,
vs. George Berzel and iMary Berzel, his wife, et al, Defts., The State of North
Daokta, Deft. and Resp.
That whenever the meaning of a word or phrase is defined In any statute,
such definition is applicable to the same words or phrase wherever it occurs,
except, when a contrary intention clearly appears ('Section 7279 Comp. Laws
of North Dakota 1913).
That by a statutory definition the word "liens" includes "mortgages."
(Section 6699, 6704, 6725 Comp. Laws of North Dakota 1913).
That the phrase "all other judgments and liens" as used in Section 8,
Chapter 162, Laws of North Dakota, 1919, as amended by Chapter 315, Laws
of North Dakota 1931, includes "mortgage."
That a regulation in aid of a proper exercise of the police power may not
be manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable.
That Section 8, Chapter 162, Laws of North Uakota 1919 as amended by
Chapter 315, Laws of North Dakota 1931, would subordinate the lien of plain-
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tiffs mortgage to the lien of the State's judgment, without notice
to the plaintiff at the time he accepted his mortgage that it might be so subordinated, and insofar as it permits such a result, it deprives the plaintiff of
-his property without due process of law, in violation of both the Constitution
of North Dakota and the Constitution of the United States.
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Hon. Harvey J. Miller,
Judge.
REVERSED. Opinion of the court by Burke, J.

In

0. M. Johnson, Respt., vs. Armour & Company, a corporation, Applt.

That an agreement between an upper and a lower riparian owner by the
terms of which the latter conveys to the former the right to discharge waste
products, sewage and refuse matter into the stream, and to permit the same
to be carried off by the flow of the stream through the premises of the lower
riparian owner, creates an easement on the land of the lower riparian owner.
That where such an agreement provides that in consideration of the furnishing of electric power and other valuable consideration the lower riparian
owner releases th upper riparian owner from all damages which may accrue
to the lower riparian owner because of such discharge of waste material,
such release covers all damages which may accrue because of the pollution
of the stream.
That when under such contract, the lower riparian owner binds himself,
his heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, and such contract is placed
on record, subsequent purchasers of any portion of the land affected thereby
are bound by the agreement.
That in such event, such contract, when duly executed, is a complete defense against any action for recovery of damages to the said premises, incident to the discharge of such sewage brought by a subsequent purchaser.
Appeal from an order of the District Court of Cass County sustaining a
demurrer to the answer of the Defendant, Hon. Daniel B. Holt, Judge.
REVERSED.

Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.

In Herman Holien, Administrator of the Estate of Ole Holien, Deceased.
Respt., vs. )Cecelia Staveteig, Applt.
That where a creditor and debtor, in an attempt to adjust their financial
relations enter into an agreement to the effect that if the creditor will scale
down his indebtedness from $14,000.00 to $11,000.00, the debtor will pay the
creditor $7,400.00, the proceeds of a loan made through the Farm Credit Administration of the Federal Government, $2,400.00 additional in cash and
execute and deliver a promissory note in the sum of $1,200.00, and thereafter
this agreement is fully executed according to its terms, the fact that some
time thereafter the creditor signs and delivers to the Farm Credit Administration, through various agencies, a "Creditor's Agreement", wherein the
creditor purports to accept the proceeds of the loan in full satisfaction of the
$11,000.00, does not release the debtor from the payment of the note given,
there being no evidence showing that at the time the scale down agreement
was made and fully executed, the execution of such agreement was one of the
terms of settlement, or even was contemplated. So far as this case is concerned, there was no consideration for the execution of said Creditor's Agreement.
That evidence examined, and it is held; that the appellant is the owner
of the note involved in this transaction, and is entitled to have the same paid
in the due process of administration of the estate of the maker.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Grand Forks County,
Hon. P. G. Swenson, Judge.
REVERSED AND JUDGMENT ORDERED FOR APPEILNT.
Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.

